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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EDUCATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION-
TOWARDS INTELLIGENCE AND VIRTUE: ARKANSAS EMBARKS ON A
COURT-MANDATED SEARCH FOR AN ADEQUATE AND EQUITABLE SCHOOL
FUNDING SYSTEM. Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark.
31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas Constitution proclaims that "[i]ntelligence and virtue
[are] the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and good govern-
ment."' Our society's emphasis on education traces back to our nation's
founding.2 Arkansans appreciate the value of education enough to associate
educational deficiencies with the state's poverty, its low-paying jobs, and
the overall degradation of its citizens' welfare.3
Many argue that the state's public schools have not kept pace with the
state's understanding of and appreciation for the benefits of education.4
Some might blame this shortcoming on a resistance to change, and at least
one study suggests that the level of school financing discrepancy and the
popular will for change are societal functions defined by regions.5 The
greater society's resistance to change, the more reluctant the state legislature
is to reform the state's school finance system; therefore, court action often
becomes necessary for reform.
6
In Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee ("Lake View IV"),
7
the Arkansas Supreme Court ended ten years of litigation when it deter-
mined that the Arkansas school funding system was both inadequate and
inequitable.8 This ruling required the state to examine both the formulae and
the underlying concepts in how it provides public education for Arkansas's
children.9 The court's ruling demonstrated the unique nature of school fund-
1. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 14, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. of 1874 amend. 53.
2. See Christine M. Durham, The History and Contemporary Content of Constitutional
Mandates for Public Education: Obligations of the Judicial Branch, 15 UTAH B. J. 33, 33
(2002) (pointing out that Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were among those re-
sponsible for bringing education to the forefront of our nation's culture).
3. See, e.g., Jim Argue, Jr., A Chance for Schools: Lakeview Case Means the State
Needs To Decide, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 2003, at 79.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63
ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1125 (2000) (explaining the hypothesis of sub-cultural typologies and
describing "traditionalistic" states as resistant to changes).
6. See id.
7. 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002).
8. Id.,91 S.W.3d at 472.
9. See generally id. at 97-98, 91 S.W.3d at 511 (finding that the state would have to
get more involved in school funding allocations and expenditures to satisfy the school fund-
ing system's "dire need" for repair).
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ing cases because the court determined what was not constitutional yet did
not provide the standard that would make the system constitutional.' 0
This note first describes the ten-year history of this case, from its
beginning in a small town in eastern Arkansas to its statewide effect."
Then, the note discusses the history of school funding litigation throughout
the nation and what the measurements of "equity" and "adequacy" mean in
the context of school funding.' 2 Next, the note details how the Arkansas
Supreme Court arrived at its findings of inequity and inadequacy.' 3 Finally,
this note demonstrates how the court used judicial activism to open the door
for reform while leaving unanswered the question of what would make the
school funding system constitutional. 14
II. FACTS
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision on November 21, 2001, cul-
minated over ten years of litigation. 15 In 2000 the court remarked that the
"case [had] taken on a life of its own"'16 and that its history "is long and tor-
tured."'17 This section divides that life into three phases. The first phase in-
cludes the challengers' successful initial suit and the legislature's responses
to that challenge. The second phase involves the parties' attempts to bring
finality, first through agreement, then through dismissal. The third phase is
the court's determination as to whether the cumulative legislative response
complied with the court's initial findings.
A. Initial Litigation and Resulting Legislation
On August 19, 1992, Lake View School District Number 25 of Phillips
County, Arkansas, along with the school district's board members and other
Phillips County residents ("Lake View") filed a lawsuit challenging the
public school funding system.' 8 The suit listed the following state officials
10. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 511; see William H. Clune, School Finance Reform: The Role of
the Courts 3 (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ. ed., Feb. 1993), available at
http://www.cpre.org/publications/fb03.pdf.
II. See discussion infra Part lI.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 91, 91 S.W.3d at 507; see discussion infra Part V.
15. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 42, 91 S.W.3d at 477.
16. Lakeview Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 501, 10 S.W.3d 892, 904
(2000) (Glaze, J., dissenting) ("Lake View I1').
17. Id. at 484, 10 S.W.3d at 893.
18. Id. at 483-84, 10 S.W.3d at 893-94. The school funding system in place in 1992
resulted from the School Finance Act of 1984 that passed on November 1, 1983, and went
into effect on January 1, 1984. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-20-302 to -321 (Michie Repl.
1993). This legislation was passed as a result of the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding that
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as defendants: the Governor, the Speaker of the Arkansas House of Repre-
sentatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Arkansas Senate, the Treasurer
of the State of Arkansas, officers of the Arkansas Department of Education,
and Arkansas Board of Education members ("State"). 19 Lake View asserted
that the Arkansas school funding system was unconstitutional because it
violated the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, 20 the Ar-
kansas Constitution's Equal Protection Clause,2 ' and the Arkansas Constitu-
tion's Education Clause.22
On November 9, 1994, the Pulaski County Chancery Court23 ruled that
the school funding system violated the Arkansas Constitution based on the
disparity between wealthy and poor school districts.24 The court found the
funding system unconstitutional because (1) districts raised local revenues
dependent upon local property value; (2) districts could increase the vari-
ances by raising local taxes in excess of the state-prescribed minimum; and
(3) the state funding formula did not correct the disparities.25 The court
stayed the effect of its order for two years so the General Assembly could
develop an equitable funding system.26 The Arkansas Supreme Court de-
scribed this decision, along with two December 21, 1994, modifications, as
the "1994 Order.
27
In an effort to comply with the 1994 Order, the Arkansas General As-
sembly enacted Act 91628 and Act 91729 in April of 1995 ("1995 Legislative
the prior funding system was unconstitutional. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279
Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); see also discussion infra Part III.A. 1.C.
19. Lake View 11, 340 Ark. at 483, 10 S.W.3d at 893.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 2, §§ 2-3, 18.
22. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 14, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. of 1874 amend. 53
(stating that "[i]ntelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a
free and good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient
system of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education").
23. Effective July 1, 2001, Arkansas's circuit courts and chancery courts merged, and
they all became circuit courts. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31, n.l, 91 S.W.3d 472, 477 n.l
(2002) (citing ARK. CONST. of 1874 amend. 80). All lower court decisions referenced in this
note are dated prior to July 1, 2001; therefore, this note refers to the lower courts as "chan-
cery courts."
24. See Lake View 11, 340 Ark. at 484-85, 10 S.W.3d at 894; Bruce B. Tidwell, Survey
of Legislation, 1995 Arkansas General Assembly: Education, 18 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK L.J.
317, 317 n.2 (1996) (citing Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Tucker, No. 92-5318 (Ark. Ch.
Nov. 9, 1994) ("1994 Order")).
25. Lake View 11, 340 Ark. at 484-85, 10 S.W.3d at 894.
26. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 894.
27. See, e.g., Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 42, 91 S.W.3d at 477.
28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-312 (Michie Repl. 1995). Act 916 prescribed a ten percent
surcharge on income taxes for school districts that failed to assess the base school-funding
millage; however, the Arkansas Supreme Court later found this Act unconstitutional on other
2003)
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Acts"). Act 917 repealed the previous school funding system, required the
State Board of Education to conduct an adequacy study, and provided for
state supplements to local school districts to meet the state-established base
millage.30
On March 11, 1996, the State appealed, challenging both'the constitu-
tionality of the 1994 Order and the court's method of calculating equity.
31
The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the 1994 Order
was not yet final and thus not ripe for appeal.32 The State argued that the
1995 Legislative Acts made the case moot because the previous, unconstitu-
tional funding system had been replaced.3 3 The court dismissed this theory
because the old funding system would be effective until July 1, 1996. 34
After Lake View I, the chancery court took additional steps in the liti-
gation process.3 5 On August 13, 1996, the court scheduled trial for Novem-
ber 1996 to determine if the State had complied with the 1994 Order. 36 In
Lake View's fourth amended complaint, the school district asked the court
to find the 1995 Legislative Acts unconstitutional, and the school district
also sought class certification. 37 On November 18, 1996, Chancellor Anna-
belle Clinton Imber recused, 38 and the case was reassigned to Chancellor
Collins Kilgore. 39 The chancery court postponed the compliance trial and
found that the 1995 Legislative Acts, which the court presumed were consti-
tutional, would be considered within the scope of facts for the compliance
determination.4 °
The state enacted additional school financing legislation in 1996 and
1997.4' On November 5, 1996, the people of Arkansas passed Amendment
74 of the Arkansas constitution ("Amendment 74").42 Amendment 74 re-
grounds. See Lake View H, 340 Ark. at 485 n.2, 10 S.W.3d at 894 n.2 (citing Barclay v. Mel-
ton, 339 Ark. 362, 5 S.W.3d 457 (1999)).
29. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-20-301 to -320 (Michie Repl. 1995).
30. Id. (repealing the School Finance Act effective July 1, 1996).
31. See Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25,323 Ark. 693, 917 S.W.2d 530 (1996)
("Lake View 1").
32. Id. at 697, 917 S.W.2d at 533.
33. Id., 917 S.W.2d at 533.
34. Id., 917 S.W.2d at 533.
35. Lake View I, 340 Ark. 481, 486, 10 S.W.3d 892, 895 (2000).
36. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 895.
37. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 895. On August 22, 1996, the court approved class certification for
everyone affected by the state's school districts: students, parents, school boards, and tax-
payers. Id., 10 S.W. 3d at 895.
38. In January 1997 Judge Imber became an Associate Justice of the Arkansas Supreme
Court. See id. at 487, 10 S.W.3d at 895.
39. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31,44 n.4, 91 S.W.3d 472, 478 n.4 (2002).
40. See Lake View 11, 351 Ark. at 487, 10 S.W.3d at 895-96.
41. See id. at 486-88, 10 S.W.3d at 895-96.
42. ARK. CONST. of 1874 amend. 74.
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quires all school districts to enact a minimum property tax rate of twenty-
five mills and to use those funds for the operation and maintenance of their
schools. 43 The amendment also provides that districts may tax beyond the
twenty-five mills to acquire additional funds for the operation and mainte-
nance of schools.44 In 1997 the State enacted Act 13074' and Act 110846
("1997 Legislative Acts"). Act 1307 defined which revenue sources count
towards the minimum twenty-five mills and established that high school
graduates should "demonstrate a defined minimum level of competence in
English Communications, oral reading and writing; [m]athematical skills;
and [s]cience and social studies disciplines. '' 7 Act 1108 established the
goals of providing students with basic skills competency, practical skills
application, and state assessments to measure student achievement.48
B. Agreement and Dismissal Attempts
On May 29, 1997, Lake View filed its fifth amended complaint in
which it challenged the constitutionality of both the 1995 Legislative Acts
and the 1997 Legislative Acts.49 The chancery court gave Lake View until
November 21, 1997, either to resubmit its complaint free of conclusory al-
legations or to submit a different pleading.50 Lake View chose to submit a
petition to show cause as to why the court should not hold the State in con-
tempt for non-compliance with the 1994 Order.5' The State filed a motion to
52dismiss Lake View's petition.
While these actions were pending, the parties filed an Agreed Order.53
The proposed settlement stated, inter alia, that Lake View would dismiss
the case after the court resolved the attorneys' fees and costs issues, which
the court could consider after Lake View submitted its application for those
fees and costs. 54 The chancellor rejected the Agreed Order.
55
43. See id. A mill is 1/10 of one cent or .001 dollars, so 25 mills is .025 dollars. Millage
is mills per dollar of valuation. See Michael Rowett, Re-look at Schools' Funding Rejected,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2002, at 1.
44. ARK. CONST. of 1874 amend. 74.
45. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-20-302 to -327 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
46. Id. §§ 6-15-1001 to -1011 (LEXIS Repl. 1999) (establishing the Arkansas Compre-
hensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability Program).
47. Id. §§ 6-20-302 etseq.
48. Id. §§6-15-1001 to -1011.
49. Lake View 1l, 340 Ark. 481,488, 10 S.W.3d 892, 896 (2000).
50. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 896.
51. Id. at 488-89, 10 S.W.3d at 896-97.
52. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 896-97.
53. Id. at 489, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
54. See id. at 489, 10 S.W.3d at 897. The court's award of attorneys' fees was a large
portion of Lake View's case, necessitating that it file a separate brief on attorneys' fees alone.
See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31, 46, 91 S.W.3d 472, 479 (2002). The attorneys' fee issues are
2003]
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On August 17, 1998, the chancery court found that the combination of
Amendment 74, Act 917, and Act 916 made both Lake View's fourth
amended complaint and its show-cause petition moot. 56 The court, therefore,
dismissed both the complaint and the petition.57 Lake View had the burden
of overcoming the legislation's presumption of constitutionality, but the
court determined that Lake View had not provided sufficient facts to meet
its burden.58 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, reversed and re-




In September 2000, six months after Lake View II, the chancery court
commenced the compliance trial.60 The trial lasted for nineteen days, in-
volved thirty-six witnesses, produced 187 exhibits, and resulted in a ninety-
nine volume appellate record with 20,878 pages.61 On May 25, 2001, the
chancery court found that the school funding system was still inequitable
and inadequate.
62
The compliance trial brought to light several indications of Arkansas's
student performance as measured by rankings.63 In per capita elementary
and secondary education expenditures, Arkansas ranked fiftieth among the
states. 64 Between 1990 and 1999, Arkansas students scored significantly
beyond the scope of this note.
55. See Lake View 1, 484 Ark. at 490, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
56. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898-99.
57. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898-99.
58. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898-99.
59. Id. at 495, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
60. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31, 45, 91 S.W.3d 472, 479 (2002). Also in September
2000, the Rogers and Bentonville School Districts, who were intervenors on behalf of the
State, filed a cross-claim against the State. Id. at 45-46, 91 S.W.3d at 479. They filed the
cross-claim because, although they agreed that the funding system was equitable, they did
not think the funding system met the newly presented test of adequacy. Id., 91 S.W.3d at
479. One hundred and forty-four of the state's 310 school districts agreed that the legislative
actions had corrected the inequities in the school funding system, yet the chancery court
denied the districts' requests to join as intervenors. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 479. In addition to the
Rogers and Bentonville School Districts, the Alma School District, the Little Rock School
District (which later joined in the appeal challenging the adequacy of the state school funding
system), and the Pulaski County Special School District were joined as intervenors. Id., 91
S.W. 3d at 479.
61. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 479.
62. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5318, 49, 53-54 (Ark. Ch.
2001).
63. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 59-60, 91 S.W.3d at 488.
64. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 488.
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below average on national standardized tests. 65 Of Arkansas's fourth-grade
students tested in reading and math, only forty-four percent and thirty-four
percent, respectively, were proficient in those subjects.66 The math scores
worsened for eighth-grade students, who demonstrated a sixteen-percent
proficiency rate.67 Admissions officials at Arkansas's universities required
fifty-eight percent of entering Arkansas students to take either math or Eng-
lish remediation courses before they could start collegiate coursework.6 8
The trial also introduced non-performance discrepancies caused by the
school funding system.69 In teacher salaries, Arkansas ranked forty-fifth in
the nation and last among its bordering states.7° Some schools could not
meet basic equipment demands. 7' The court listed multiple examples of
substandard facilities, primarily in the eastern part of the state.72
The 2001 school funding system that the chancery court found uncon-
stitutional had three funding sources: federal funds targeted for special
needs students, state funds, and local funds that derived primarily from
property taxes. 73 The state distributed the funds through a complex, techni-
cal state funding formula designed to equalize the per-pupil revenue dispari-
ties among the districts.74
The state offered guarantees to the local districts beyond the funding
formula. 75 To diminish the extent of disparities between districts, the state
65. See id., 91 S.W.3d at 488.
66. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 488.
67. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 488.
68. See id., 91 S.W.3d at 488.
69. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5318, 39-40 (Ark. Ch.
2001).
70. Id. The trial court pointed to one example in which a science teacher at the Lake
View high school possessed two masters degrees and had over forty-one years of experience,
yet made only $31,500 per year. Id.
71. See, e.g., id. at 15. For example, Lake View's math classroom had one useable
chalkboard, on which tests had to be written because of a dilapidated duplicating machine,
and the school did not have enough graphing calculators for its trigonometry class of only ten
students. Id.
72. See id. at 18 (finding "poor heating and air conditioning systems, broken and miss-
ing windows, missing floor tiles and walls in need of repair").
73. See id. at 11.
74. See id. The court offered a "simplified explanation" of the school funding formula
in Arkansas. Id. The funding formula started with the calculation of two numbers, the "local
resource rate" and the "base level revenue." See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31, 47, 91 S.W.3d
472, 480 (2002). The local resource rate represented the per-pupil revenue that a district
raised from property taxes. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 480. The base level revenue represented the
per-pupil equal share of the state's total school funding revenue, from both the state and all
local funding sources. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 480. If the local resource rate was less than the base
level revenue, then the state supplemented the difference through Equalization Aid. Id., 91
S.W.3d at 480.
75. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 48-49, 91 S.W.3d at 481.
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guaranteed a per-student minimum funding rate, termed "additional base
funding," that was equal to eighty percent of the per-pupil rate of the school
at the ninety-fifth percentile.76 The state also provided funds for computer
and bus purchases and facility repairs through the Growth Facilities Fund-
ing program. 7 The Debt Service program offered assistance in servicing
debt incurred from capital improvement projects.78
The 2001 school funding system did not differ much from the 1994
school funding system.79 The primary difference was the change from pro-
viding additional funds for special-needs students through the school fund-
ing formula in 1994 to providing those additional funds through special
categories outside of the formula in 2001 .80 Both systems started with a per-
pupil funding amount based on available funds, and then each system used
that foundation in attempts to provide equal per-pupil revenues throughout
the state.8 1 Neither system solved Arkansas's educational funding problems;
therefore, the battle in the courts continued.82
III. BACKGROUND
As a nation we have an appreciation for the benefits of education to
both individuals and society.83 Indeed, even the courts have taken notice of
the impact that education has on the success of our civilization. 84 Although
the recognition of educational importance is almost universal, there has
been formidable opposition to the school funding reform initiatives.85 These
forces have made it difficult for the political branches or the administrative
76. See id, 91 S.W.3d at 481 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-303(17) (LEXIS Repi.
1999)) (defining the ninety-fifth percentile as a ranking based on the total per-pupil revenue
from both state and local sources).
77. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 481.
78. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 481.
79. Id. at 47,91 S.W.3d at 480.
80. See id.; see also discussion infra Part III.A. 1.b.i.
81. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 48, 91 S.W.3d at 480.
82. See id. at 71, 91 S.W.3d at 496 (stating that Arkansas had not fulfilled its obligation
to provide every child with an adequate education).
83. See, e.g., Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in
the 1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 136,
136 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999), available at http://books.nap.edu /books/0309065631
/html/R I .html.
84. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Expla-
nation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 550-52 (1998) (explaining the judicial recognition of how edu-
cation affects personal and national economics, politics, and social growth).
85. See Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 83, at 137-39 (indicating the various political




agencies to bring reform,86 and the courts find themselves amidst this politi-
cally-charged fray. 87 This section discusses the legal challenges to our pub-
lic school finance systems, following with an exploration of the opposition
to school finance reform.
A. The Case for Reform
Challenges to state school finance systems have spanned the last thirty
years and have involved litigation in forty-one states.88 Almost half of those
states have found for those challenging the constitutionality of the funding
system89 while the rest have found for the states.90 Challengers have pre-
sented two basic arguments for the necessity of school finance reform: in-
equity and inadequacy. 91 Both litigants and courts often confuse these ar-
guments, and this confusion only adds to the inherent difficulty of assessing
the merits of both arguments.92
1. The Equity Challenge
Litigants first challenged public school financing systems by basing
their arguments on equal protection.93 In examining the equity question, this
section first discusses the nation's equity litigation history.94 Because equity
86. See id. at 141 (explaining that the political environment leads to a lack of incentives
for the majoritarian branches to resolve school funding issues).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in
the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 84, at 35, 41-46;
Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, 1999 Florida Constitution Revision: Setting a New Stan-
dard for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State To Make "Adequate
Provision "for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329 app. 1I at 402-09 (2000) (summarizing
each state's educational funding litigation). See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002) (finding that the
court's ordering of remedies to school finance inadequacy would be a violation of the separa-
tion of powers and dismissing the prior order that the legislature comply with the court order
to develop an adequate system); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989).
89. See Mills & McClendon, supra note 88, at 402-09.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., William E. Thro, Issues in Education Law and Policy: Judicial Analysis
During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a
Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601-03 (1994).
92. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995) (stating that
"[w]hat constitutes an appropriate education or even an 'equal, adequate, and meaningful'
one, 'is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues"') (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43).
93. See Thro, supra note 91, at 600-01.
94. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.a.
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as an argument is difficult to understand without a basic understanding of
what finance equity means, the note then examines the empirical determina-
tion of equity.95 This section concludes by discussing how Arkansas has
fared in the school funding equity analysis.96
a. Equity litigation
Americans have often used the judicial process in our constant search
for equal opportunity. 97 The question of equal opportunity was a natural
result of the Supreme Court's almost revolutionary approach to the Four-
teenth Amendment in the 1950s and 1960s.98 In particular, Brown v. Board
of Education99 and its progeny brought education and the Equal Protection
Clause together.100 The idea that education serves as the great equalizing
key to success in our society contributed to the bringing of educational
challenges based on equal opportunity.'0l In light of these circumstances,
litigants naturally saw equal protection as the appropriate path for chal-
lenges to school finance systems.'
0 2
Commentators have expressed the evolution of school finance reform
in terms of three "waves" of litigation. 10 3 The first wave consisted of those
challenges based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 1°4 In 1973 the United States Supreme Court found that equality in
school financing is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution;
therefore, the Court did not find a state's school finance system in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 5 The Court found that equal educational
funding was not a fundamental right because the Constitution neither ex-
plicitly nor impliedly provided for such a right.
10 6
After the Court's ruling in Rodriguez, litigants turned to the state
courts. 10 7 All states have educational clauses in their constitutions providing
95. See discussion infra Part II.A. I.b.
96. See discussion infra Part I1.A. 1.c.
97. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Re-
form, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 101 (1995) (citing the nation's equality litigation in the areas of
racial equality, interstate commerce, and equal rights for those with disabilities).
98. See id at 116.
99. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100. Id. at 495.
101. See Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to the
Present, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 84, at 7.
102. See Enrich, supra note 97, at 117.
103. See Thro, supra note 91, at 598 n.4.
104. See id at 600.
105. See San Antonio indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973).
106. See id.
107. See Thro, supra note 91, at 601-02.
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explicit rights to education.10 8 Litigants used this naturally progressive ar-
gument to their advantage in state-based litigation in which they pointed to
an explicit education clause.
10 9
The second wave consisted of state court litigation challenging the
equal opportunity provided by school financing systems." 0 Challengers
based their cases on the state constitutions' equal protection clauses, the
state constitutions' education clauses, or both.'" California was the first
state to hear a school finance argument challenging the inequity of the
state's funding system, and the plaintiffs based their successful challenge on
the state's equal protection clause." 12 The court determined that the funding
system violated the state's equal protection clause because the state de-
signed the system so that a child's level of educational opportunity was di-
rectly related to the wealth of that child's school district." 3 In 1973 the New
Jersey Supreme Court became the first second-wave court to use the state
educational clause as the basis for finding that the school funding system
was inequitable." 4 Again, the state court found that there was inequity
based on the equal protection clause."
5
The second-wave cases had varying results because, although most
state equal protection clauses are almost identical to the federal equal pro-
tection clause, the state courts interpreted them differently. 1 6 During the
first two waves, seven state courts found their school funding systems un-
constitutional due to inequity," 17 but courts in fifteen states did not find the
funding systems unconstitutional." 18
108. See Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 344. Scholars have placed education
clauses in four categories based on the strength of what the clause guarantees. Id. Category I
clauses provide for some public school system. Id. Category II clauses annotate some mini-
mal quality standards that the public school system should provide. Id. Category Ill clauses
are more specific about the required quality standards. Id. Category IV clauses are the
strongest, because they state education as a paramount state duty. See id. For a listing of the
text of education clauses that have been cited in state constitutions with category designa-
tions, see id. app. I at 387-401. Arkansas's "efficient system" language is a Category 1I
clause. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 14, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 53; See Mills &
McLendon, supra note 88, at 345.
109. See Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 337.
110. See Thro, supra note 91, at 601-02.
Ilt. Seeid.
112. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1977).
113. See id.
114. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973).
115. Seeid. at 295.
116. See Thro, supra note 91, at 602-03.
117. See Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 337 n.30 (listing Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
118. See id at 336 n.31 (listing Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland,





One of the major challenges in answering the equity question is defin-
ing equity in school funding systems. 19 The courts have turned to empirical
data to help answer this question.120 Education policy scholars indicate that
states must address four questions to determine if a school finance system is
equitable: (1) whether it is the taxpayer or the student who should benefit
from the funding system; (2) whether states should measure revenue or dis-
tribution of educational outcomes; (3) what principles states should use to
determine equitable distribution; and (4) what statistics states should use to
determine the degree of equity.' 21 A full exploration of these questions is
beyond the scope of this note. Instead, this section explores those underly-
ing questions through three broad issues: the distribution principles, the
distribution formulae, and the determination of inequality. 2
i. Distribution principles
The basic principle underlying a school funding system is the first is-
sue in an empirical analysis. 23 Horizontal equity, vertical equity, and fiscal
neutrality are common principles that states and courts use to determine the
most equitable way to distribute school funds. 1
24
The horizontal equity principle is based on the idea that pupils who are
"equally situated" should receive equal funding. 25 The principle is based on
the concept that the amount of funding per child should be the same for all
pupils throughout the state regardless of the property valuations within the
pupils' districts. 126 The argument under this principle expounds the "one
scholar-one dollar" concept that students should be funded alike, and the
argument does not take into account the increased funding requirements for
students who have special needs.'
27
119. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 9.
120. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (evalu-
ating past and present funding formulae, equalization calculations, national rankings and test
scores in forming funding system constitutionality).
121. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, SCHOOL




125. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 18-19 (explaining that "equally situated"
means all students within a group, such as general education or at-risk groups, should be
funded alike).
126. See id.
127. See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 88, at 36.
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Funding based on the vertical equity principle, however, does factor in
the differences in funding requirements among members of designated
groups of students (e.g., Title I students, special education students, students
in poorer districts, etc.). 28 This method has been called needs-based equity
because it is based on the idea that differently situated students should re-
ceive different funding. 129 The most common way to address the varying
funding needs of student groups is to incorporate a mathematical weight
greater than one for each student with a greater funding need.
130
Fiscal neutrality is not itself a principle of funds distribution.' 3' Rather,
fiscal neutrality is a measurement of the relationship between the per-pupil
school funding and the school district's wealth. 132 A score of zero indicates
that there is no relationship between student funding and district wealth.
133
As the score increases, the relationship between funding and wealth
strengthens. 134 Fiscal neutrality is a valuable tool in determining funds dis-
tribution hecause it can be used as a basis for measuring the need for the




States use two basic formulae for the distribution of state funds to
school districts within the state. 136 The first is the foundation formula, which
is designed to guarantee the same amount of education dollars for all stu-
dents. 137 In the early cases, foundation funding formulae were the standard




130. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 21 (indicating that in the 1993-94 school
year, thirty-seven states used weighting in their funding formulae). With a weighted formula,
for example, a special needs student might be funded at 1.33, which means that the student
would be funded as one and one-third students.
131. See John G. Augenblick et al., Equity and Adequacy in School Funding, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1997, at 63, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/
usrdoc/vol7no3ART5.pdf.
132. See id at 73.
133. See id at 73 fig.2; see also id. at 63-64 (indicating that a district's wealth is function
of its "ability and willingness to raise local tax revenues").
134. Id.
135. See generally Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 83, at 138, 161 (explaining that "level-
ing-up" occurs when the state supplements local tax revenues to bring poor districts up to the
prescribed per-pupil funding level); Margaret E. Goertz & Gary Natriello, Court-Mandated
School Finance Reform: What Do the New Dollars Buy?, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 99, 111.
136. See Clune, supra note 10, at 5; Goertz & Natriello, supra note 135, at 104.
137. See Goertz & Natriello, supra note 135, at 104, 132 n.5.
138. See Enrich, supra note 97, at 126 n. 119 (listing the early cases and the per-pupil
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A foundation formula starts with the state's determination of the per-
pupil base, or foundation, to which the districts contribute (usually through
funds raised with local property taxes). 139 The state provides the difference
between the district contribution and the state-prescribed foundation
amount. 140 The result is that students receive the same amount of support
regardless of their district's property value.' 41 Because this formula directly
relates to district property values, districts with higher property values re-
ceive less state funding than districts with lower property values. 42 Arkan-
sas uses a foundation program. 
43
The second basic formula is the guaranteed tax base (GTB).' 44 This
formula provides for even greater state revenue to compensate for very large
disparities in school districts' property values. 145 The formula attempts to
equalize the tax base among the districts through an established, minimum
tax base.146 Because the variable in this formula is the tax base (usually
based on property value) rather than the tax rate, using the GTB allows dis-
tricts the freedom to choose their tax rates. 47 Under this formula, the state
provides the difference between the district-chosen tax rate as applied to its
actual tax base and the district-chosen tax rate as applied to the GTB.
141
Obviously, districts with a tax base greater than the GTB would not benefit
from this formula; therefore, the formula also allows for greater state funds
distributions to districts with lower property values. 149
iii. Inequality determination
The purported goal of the various principles is to design funding for-
mulae that result in an equitable funding system.' 50 To determine if the
principles and resulting formulae meet that goal, courts must explore the
question of whether the funding system is equitable. 15 ' Different scholars
use various statistics to make this determination; however, two of the most
amounts expressed by their foundation funding plans).
139. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 17 (noting that districts generally contribute
through funds raised by local property taxes).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See generally id.
143. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.C.
144. See Clune, supra note 10, at 5; Goertz & Natriello, supra note 135, at 104, 132 n.6.
145. See Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 15-17 (2002).
146. Id.
147. See Goertz & Natriello, supra note 135, at 104 n.6.
148. See Kramer, supra note 145, at 15-17.
149. See id.
150. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 74.
151. See generally Goertz & Natriello, supra note 135, at 110-11.
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commonly used are the federal range ratio and the coefficient of varia-
tion. 52 The Arkansas court has used both of these statistics to determine
inequity.
153
The federal range ratio measures the gap between educational expendi-
tures for those students at the ninety-fifth percentile and those at the fifth
percentile; therefore, the ratio excludes those at the extreme high and low
ends of distribution. 154 The federal range ratio expresses this gap as a per-
centage of the difference between these two numbers; whereas, the "re-
stricted range" expresses the gap as a raw dollar amount.
155
The coefficient of variation measures how much district spending var-
ies from the average district. 156 Smaller variations indicate that expenditures
are more equitable throughout the state; a coefficient of zero indicates equal
spending among the districts. 157
c. School funding inequality in Arkansas: DuPree v. Alma
School District'58
In DuPree, the Arkansas Supreme Court found the Arkansas school
funding system inequitable because it based funding primarily on property
tax. 159 The state distributed both base aid funds and equalization aid funds
using a foundation method called the Minimum Foundation Program.' 60 The
state distributed one-half of the equalization aid based on a per-pupil
amount without regard to the local revenues raised; therefore, the state used
only the remaining one-half of this part of the formula to equalize funding
disparities. 162 In 1979-1980 the formula resulted in the state distributing
only 6.8% of the Minimum Foundation Program for equalization. 1
63
The court used the federal range ratio and fiscal neutrality measure-
ment to determine the inequality of the school funding system.' 64 The court
152. See id.
153. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 343, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (1983).
154. See id, 651 S.W.2d at 92 (explaining that the calculation measures, based on a list
ordering all districts by the amount they spend on education, the difference between those at
the top from those at the bottom of the list).
155. See id., 651 S.W.2d at 92.
156. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 73.
157. See id.
158. 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
159. Id at 342-43, 651 S.W.2d at 91.
160. Id,651 S.W.2d at 91.
161. Id., 651 S.W.2d at 91-92.
162. See id., 651 S.W.2d at 91-92.
163. Id., 651 S.W.2d at 91-92.
164. See DuPree, 279 Ark. at 343, 651 S.W.2d at 91-92 (evaluating computations by
comparing the difference at the ninety fifth and fifth percentiles and by measuring the extent
correlations of property-wealth to funding).
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also examined opportunity variances such as basic course offerings, facili-
ties, equipment, class size, and staff.
65
2. The Adequacy Challenge
Although the equity argument still holds considerable allure in both
society and jurisprudence, many courts have shifted to analyzing the school
finance question based on inadequacy. 166 At the heart of the adequacy
measurement lies the question of how much is enough. 167 Although the
comparison is different, adequacy is as difficult to measure as equity. 6 8
Courts have to determine what to measure: is the appropriate measurement,
for example, an outcome such as student achievements or an input such as
pre-determined funding levels? 169 After looking at the shift to adequacy as a
new basis of challenging school funding, this section looks at how courts
have made the difficult measurement determinations. Then this section
examines the different models used to fund an adequate educational system.
a. Adequacy added to the arsenal
The third wave of litigation made a considerable shift in the argument
because it moved from an argument of inequity to an argument of inade-
quacy.' 70 The Kentucky and Montana courts began this wave in 1989.171
Both of these cases, however, continued to bring up the inequality chal-
lenges. 1
72
In the second-wave 1983 Arkansas decision, the court stated, without
expressly ruling on adequacy, that the funding system would be unconstitu-
tional if great inequity still existed without a legitimate reason even if the
state funded all schools to operate at "minimal sufficiency."' 173 Rather than
using the education clause to determine adequacy, the Arkansas Supreme
165. See id., 651 S.W.2d at 91-92.
166. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 97, at 143 (stating that equality arguments continue to
be viable because of the great "argumentative power we find in the concept").
167. See id. at 171.
168. See id. at 170.
169. See id. at 170-71; Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses:
Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33
LAND& WATER L. REV. 281, 308-09 (1998).
170. See Thro, supra note 91, at 603.
171. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Mills & McLendon, supra
note 88, at 338-40.
172. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 684;
Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 338-40.




Court determined that the education clause served as support for applying
the equal protection clause. 174 In its third-wave decision, the Montana Su-
preme Court in Helena'75 took a markedly different approach in using ineq-
uity as a basis for determining that the system was inadequate; therefore, it
found the school funding system's inadequacy to be the culprit that led to
inequitable school funding.
76
A court analyzing the adequacy question must ascertain the level of
state-guaranteed education, if any, granted by the state's education clause .
77
The courts have discussed the actual wording of the education clauses much
more than they have discussed the equal opportunity clauses, because the
education clause language provides a more concrete basis upon which they
can establish constitutionality standards. 78 Theoretically, the higher the
category of the education clause, the easier challengers should find it to
successfully assert the state's duty to provide an adequate education.'
79
Education scholars disagree, however, as to the predictive nature of the ac-
tual language of the education clause, because state courts will interpret
those clauses differently.' 
80
b. Determining the adequacy standard
If the court finds that the state does have an affirmative duty to provide
an adequate education, then the court must apply the education clause stan-
dard to the current educational situation.' 8' In other words, the courts must
determine if the state's schools fall below the required quality level.' 82 Most
courts that have found state educational funding systems inadequate have
not made the determination as to what is "adequate.' 83 Instead, they have
insisted that it is the legislature's responsibility to determine adequacy, and
174. See id. at 345, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
175. 769 P.2d at 690.
176. See id.; Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 340.
177. See Thro, supra note 91, at 605.
178. See Lundberg, supra note 5, at 1112-13.
179. See Thro, supra note 91, at 606-07 (stating that, in theory, a plaintiff in a state with
a higher category has a better chance of success); see supra note 108 (describing the educa-
tion clause categories).
180. See generally Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 88, at 45-46.
181. See Thro, supra note 91, at 607.
182. Id. (arguing, inter alia, that the courts have to determine how disperse the problem
of inadequacy is before they will determine whether the entire system is unconstitutional).
183. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555
(Mass. 1993) (leaving it to the legislative branch to define adequacy); Michael Heise, Pre-
liminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 104 (2000)
(positing that not providing a standard could be the most beneficial method for the plaintiff,
because the legislature would either provide more than the court wanted or it would fail the
court's "know it when I see it" review until it did).
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the court's duty is to determine when the system is not adequate.184 In mak-
ing the determination of what is not adequate, courts have considered both
expert opinion testimony that contrasted educational services among dis-
tricts and empirical data. 185
The Kentucky Supreme Court not only found Kentucky's funding sys-
tem inadequate, but it was also the first state supreme court to find an entire
state educational system unconstitutional in Rose. 186 The Rose court went
beyond finding the system unconstitutional and actually defined the stan-
dards that the state must meet to have an adequate educational system. 87 In
1979 the West Virginia Supreme Court also provided adequacy criteria.
88
The adequacy standards established by the Kentucky and West Virginia
courts have been influential in other courts' adequacy determinations. 1
89
c. Funding for adequacy
After the state completes the mammoth task of determining what ade-
quacy is, the state must then determine how to finance its achievement. 90
School funding experts have developed five models for determining the
target per-pupil cost of providing an adequate education: the historical
spending approach, the expert design approach, the econometric approach,
the successful schools approach, and the school reform programs model. 191
The historical spending approach is the easiest to use because it uses
the previous year's spending, adjusted for inflation and educational services
changes, to determine the current year's spending needs. 192 If the previous
year's spending was inadequate, however, this method would be ineffec-
184. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989).
185. See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 552-53 (using stipulated reports and statements
describing variances in class size, curriculum, staff development, basic subject preparation,
and guidance counseling in determining an inadequate funding level for the plaintiff's school
district).
186. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 338.
187. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13 (defining the goals of an efficient education as
providing skills and training in communication, civic responsibility, physical education, and
cultural education); Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 338.
188. Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 339 n.43 (citing Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 876 (W. Va. 1979)) (describing the elements of an adequate education as training in
basic math, civic education, environmental awareness, recreation, and cultural awareness and
stating that a school's physical environment and the state's oversight are essential elements).
189. Id. at 338-39 n.43; Paul A. Minorini and Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Ade-
quacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY
AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 84, at 175,
196.
190. Augenblick, supra note 131, at 74.
191. See id. at 75-76; POLICY BRIEF: FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY 3 (WestEd July 2000),
available at http://web.wested.org/onlinejpubs/po-00-03.pdf [hereinafter WESTED].
192. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75.
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tive. 193 The historical spending approach continues to factor local school
district wealth into the formula, which is a factor that has no relevance to
educational needs.
194
The expert design approach, also known as the professional judgment
model, uses a group of professionals to first determine the elements of a
school district that would provide an adequate education, and then to deter-
mine the per-pupil costs of those elements. 195 This method has support
among educators 196 because it narrows the findings to the precise resources
needed to achieve the model district. 97 This approach, however, is highly
data intensive, and the necessary data to make the element-cost determina-
tions are not always available.' 98 An additional concern with this method is
that it usually produces spending models that far exceed current spending
levels. 199 Wyoming has surfaced as the exemplar, successfully using a
modified version of this model for its funding determinations. 00
The econometric approach, also called the cost-function analysis, links
the spending level to student performance. 20 1 The basic determination is
how much it would cost to educate students in particular circumstances to a
level at which they could provide specified outcomes (e.g., specified scores
on standardized tests).202 This method uses extensive data and complex sta-
tistics to include socioeconomic factors in the spending determination for
student groups.20 3 The econometric approach uses the law of diminishing
returns in analyzing factors, such as class size, to determine at what point
there will be no greater outcome from a smaller class size.20 4 This approach
also has support among both legislatures and economists, yet no state has
adopted the model in its funding determinations.2 5
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id; WESTED, supra note 191, at 3.
196. WESTED, supra note 191, at 3.
197. Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75.
198. Id. at 75.
199. See id. (stating that Alaska, California, and Illinois are among the states that at-
tempted this approach but later abandoned it because of the model's determination of drasti-
cally increased costs).
200. See Wyoming v. Campbell County Sch., 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001). For a detailed
discussion of the professional funding model and how Wyoming applied it, see James W.
Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling "'Adequacy" to Achieve Reality: Translating Ade-
quacy into State School Finance Distribution Arrangements, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 84 at 209, 228-46.
201. Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75; WestEd, supra note 191, at 3.
202. Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75; WestEd, supra note 191, at 3.
203. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75; WestEd, supra note 191, at 3.




The successful schools approach, also known as the typical high-
performing district model, uses the spending level of districts currently at
the required adequacy level as the model per-pupil spending level.2 °6 This
method is simple and easy to understand, and both Ohio and Mississippi
have used it.207 The school reform program model is similar to the success-
ful schools method in its success-modeling approach; however, the school
reform program identifies particular school programs rather than school
districts that have been successful.2 °8 This approach provides schools with a
definite plan for achieving results, but there is not sufficient evidence of a
truly successful program upon which schools in different districts could
model.20 9
Each of these approaches endeavors to provide the price of achieving a
state-determined level of adequacy by applying rational means to get to an
amorphous end. 210 Even if the state determined the perfect per-pupil for-
mula for achieving adequacy, the state's duty would not end.2 1' The fluid
standard of adequacy is relative to time and circumstances, so the quest for
adequacy is continuous. 1 2
B. The Forces of Opposition
In the three decades of evolving arguments and increasingly complex
measurement issues, at least one thing has remained constant in school fi-
nance reform litigation--opposition to reform.2 13 This section presents the
basic arguments opposing school finance reform. First, this section looks at
the state-defendant's assertions of justiciability concerns before discussing
the local control arguments. Then, this section discusses local control argu-
ments. Next, the section explores contentions involving non-funding factors.
This section concludes with a look at how the arguments have endured in
light of the shift to adequacy-based challenges.
1. Justiciability Issues
States have challenged the court's involvement in the issue of school
funding, arguing that the question is a political one better left to the majori-
206. Id.; WESTED, supra note 191, at 3.
207. Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75; WESTED, supra note 191, at 4.
208. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75; WESTED, supra note 191, at 4.
209. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 75; WESTED, supra note 191, at 4.
210. See, e.g., WESTED, supra note 191, at 4.
211. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 97, at 171 (indicating that adequacy changes as society,
economics, and society's expectations change).
212. See id.
213. See generally Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 83, at 136-37 (explaining how the politi-
cal arguments have plagued school finance reform since the 1970s).
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tarian branches.214 The United States Supreme Court first set out the politi-
cal question criteria in Baker v. Carr.215 Those challenging the court's in-
volvement in school finance primarily base their arguments on the "textu-
ally demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department" and the lack of "judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards" inherent in school funding issues.216
Opponents of court involvement assert that it is a legislative function
to decide what defines an adequate education.217 Further, the opponents
assert that the courts are not the appropriate branch for deciding complex
school finance questions that require extensive fact-finding and political
considerations. 218 Defenders of the school funding systems also argue that
there are no standards by which courts can determine whether school fund-
ing systems are either equitable or adequate. 219 Other commentators express
concern that the courts set themselves up for additional litigation with find-
ings based on unclear standards and that such findings place the courts in
judicial oversight roles until the legislatures devise systems that the courts
adjudicate as meeting those unclear standards.22 °
Some courts have agreed with these contentions and have chosen not
to mandate reform even where those courts found discrepancies. 221 Other
courts assert that state courts do not have the same separation of powers
restrictions under which the federal branches operate.222 Some courts have
214. See, e.g., Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002).
215. 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
216. Id.; Heise, supra note 84, at 303.
217. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190 (111. 1996).
218. Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as
Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60
U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 250 (1998) (citing Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877
P.2d 806, 827 (Ariz. 1994) (Moeller, V.C.J., dissenting)).
219. See, e.g., Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc., v. Chiles, 680
So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996).
220. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (stating that the
courts' assumption of a legislative role would likely result in extensive costly and time-
consuming litigation).
221. See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002) (dismissing the case because the
court found that an imposed remedy would usurp the legislature's power); Coalition for
Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, 680 So. 2d at 400 (finding that it would be an intru-
sion into the legislature's realm to find a school funding system inadequate without a meas-
urable standard for adequacy); Comm. for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1178 (stating that the
court did not indorse the school funding system simply because it found the issue to be non-
justiciable); Marrero v. Pennsylvania, 739 A.2d 110 (Penn. 1999); City of Pawtucket, 662
A.2d at 40 (stating that the court's interference in resolving educational deficiencies through
funding mandates would have chaotic results).
222. See Enrich, supra note 97, at 172 (describing the state judicial structure as more
political, the state constitutions as more easily adaptable to change, and the state constitu-
tions as free from federalism concerns).
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not addressed the political question, while many simply incorporate the po-
litical nature of the education clauses into their decisions. 23
Commentators opine that when legislatures have previously attempted
to resolve school finance issues, the courts will be less willing to get in-
volved.224 As a general matter, courts do not want to interfere with the po-
litically-based issue of school finance, but some commentators argue that
they only do so because of "a demonstrated failure to address education
finance policy" by the other branches.225 In DuPree, Justice Hickman ad-
dressed this issue head-on, stating that the court had before it "a problem
that the other branches of government have either been unable or unwilling
to resolve. 226 The courts' involvement is not entirely surprising.227 As one
scholar pointed out, "[t]his involvement of the courts would seem to be in-
evitable, for as de Tocqueville aptly wrote, 'Scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question. '228
2. Local Control
Perhaps the most consistent argument against school finance reform is
that statewide reformation attempts would lead to decreased local control. 2 9
At least since the struggle for racial equality in education began, the judici-
ary has been well aware of the local orientation of education. 230 The United
States Supreme Court reflected this awareness when it stated that "educa-
tion is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. '23 1 Challengers to court intervention take this theme into the current
era of school litigation as they argue that local school districts might be bet-
ter situated to determine the most efficient use of local school funds.232
223. See Lundberg, supra note 5, at 1107 (citing McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993)).
224. See Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Su-
preme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (2000).
225. Id. at 1163-64 (stating that courts only get involved when other measures have
either failed or have not been addressed by the other branches).
226. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 351, 651 S.W.2d 90, 96 (1983)
(Hickman, J., concurring); See Swenson, supra note 224, at 1163.
227. See Swenson, supra note 224, at 1163.
228. Mills & McLendon, supra note 88, at 335 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. XVI, at 280 (Everyman's Library, 1994)).
229. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 97, at 159 n.282 (asserting that all courts have ad-
dressed the local control concern in school finance equity cases).
230. See id.
231. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see Enrich, supra note 97, at 117
(citing the school finance movement's repeated use of the expanded version of this passage
as demonstrative of the Court's recognition of education's importance in society).
232. Clune, supra note 10, at 3.
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These opponents of court involvement generally argue that states should
spend local dollars on local students, and that the feeling of local ownership
leads to increased support for both property-based taxation and the schools
themselves.233
Another argument against reformation plans is that the plans redistrib-
234ute funds from wealthier districts to poorer districts. Redistribution, by its
operation, results in either fewer funds for the wealthy districts or increased
taxation for those districts (if they choose to keep the same, pre-
redistribution funding levels for their schools).235 With the success of prop-
erty-based taxation resting, at least somewhat, on local ownership of the
local services derived from those taxes, increased state control would likely
require either other taxation sources or reductions of other state services to
provide increased educational funding.236
Local control has lost some of its appeal in light of the recognition that
the world into which students will enter is increasingly global in nature, and
a more standardized curriculum might better prepare them for the global
competition.237 Additionally, some commentators argue that local politics
bring the credibility of local decision-makers into question, because taxation
concerns heavily influence educational spending decisions.238 Other com-
mentators claim that the current system actually denies true local control
because students and parents with few options and limited opportunities
have no real control.239
3. Non-funding Factors
Challengers further argue that more money will not necessarily im-
prove the quality of education. 240 These observers claim that equalizing
dollar expenditures without considering other factors contributing to educa-
233. See generally Enrich, supra note 97, at 160-61.
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., id. at 114 (positing that California's attempts to bring equality in the af-
termath of Serrano, coupled with declining economic conditions, led to a degradation of the
quality of California's school system-yet, it maintained the requisite equity).
236. See id at 164 (expressing the strong interrelationship between local taxation and
local control). Some states have asserted that the funding of other state programs serves as a
legitimate reason to provide fewer educational dollars towards ensuring equity, but courts
have been reluctant to endorse this argument. See, e.g., Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) (finding that "fiscal difficulties in no way justify
perpetuating inequities").
237. See generally Clune, supra note 10, at 3.
238. See id.
239. See, e.g., Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690.
240. See Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 83, at 152 (stating that researchers have found no




tional results would not likely bring equitable results. 24' Reform that
addresses this nexus would require decreased local autonomy because the
state would address those factors at the state level.242 Others claim that no
amount of state adjustment to these non-funding factors would vitiate the
"environments and . . . the capacities with which [students] arrive at
school. 243
Opponents of reform also claim that educational opportunities are
bleak in some districts because of local-fund mismanagement, too much
administrative overhead, or even corruption.24 The Kentucky Supreme
Court dismissed these purported reasons for discounting reform, stating that
"[e]ven a total elimination of all mismanagement and waste in local school
districts would not correct the situation as it now exists. 245 Rather than
dismissing reform altogether, the Rose court used the non-funding factors as
reasons for finding the entire educational system, not just the funding, un-
constitutional.246
4. Opposition and the Shift to Adequacy
The foundation plans contested in the early equity-based challenges
were, by nature, adequacy-based, and attacking those systems head-on
would have been an attack on the adequacy of funding.247 Instead, the early
decisions looked at the fairness of the foundation plans.248 Adequacy argu-
ments, however, addressed the level of education provided to all children
rather than developing formulae to ensure a fair dispersion of the state's
educational resources.249
Educational reform advocates shifted their arguments, at least in part,
because it is difficult to disagree with the idea that all children should re-
ceive a quality education.250 These advocates found it easier to challenge the
concept that poorer districts should receive the fruits of development cre-
ated by wealthier districts. 251 Equity arguments challenge the constitutional-
ity of school funding systems based on a child-to-child comparison; how-
241. See Enrich, supra note 97, at 149 (noting examples such as facilities, staff, class
sizes, and curriculum).
242. See id. at 149-50.
243. See id. at 150.
244. See Thro, supra note 91, at 608 (asserting that courts must consider factors other
than finance in resolving the reasons for inadequacy).
245. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989).
246. See id.; Thro, supra note 91, at 608.
247. See Enrich, supra note 97, at 126-27.
248. See id. at 127.





ever, the adequacy question challenges the constitutionality based on a
comparison of the education that a child actually receives to the education
that the child should receive.252
Advocates for reform countering the local control argument in equity-
based challenges assert that solutions based on a funds-distribution formula
allow school districts to maintain local control of both their district's activi-
ties and their taxing rates. 25 3 The counter-argument modified for adequacy-
based challenges is that districts do maintain some control because they can
spend beyond the base amount required for adequacy, thereby creating in-
equity beyond adequacy through local discretion.254
Adequacy-based school finance reform continues to be politically con-
tentious, because the business of legislating involves juggling interests that
compete for available resources.255 Opponents continue to assert that setting
a pre-determined school funding level challenges the traditional negotiation
methods for determining fund allocations. 256 Notwithstanding the at-times
fierce opposition, Arkansas school reform advocates spent a decade in
court making their case for an adequate and equitable school financing sys-
tem.
IV. REASONING
Before the Arkansas Supreme Court could address the constitutionality
of the school financing system, the court first had to determine whether it
was reviewing the 1994 Order257 or the 2001 compliance trial order ("2001
Order"). 258 The court found that the compliance trial leading to the 2001
Order properly took into consideration the post-1994 Order legislation;
therefore, the court was reviewing the 2001 Order.25 9 In its decision the
court addressed both the court's role in educational funding issues and the
260constitutionality of Arkansas's funding system.
252. See generally id. at 168-71.
253. See Enrich, supra note 97, at 146.
254. See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 189, at 198-99. But see Wyoming v. Camp-
bell County Sch., 19 P.3d 518, 536 (Wyo. 2001) (finding that any inequality violates the state
constitution regardless of its creation beyond the adequacy threshold).
255. See Augenblick, supra note 131, at 74-75.
256. Id.
257. See discussion supra Part II.A.
258. See discussion supra Part l1.C.
259. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31, 50, 91 S.W.3d 472, 482 (2002). The decision, writ-
ten by Justice Robert L. Brown, unanimously determined that Arkansas's school funding
system is unconstitutional. Id. Justices Donald L. Corbin and Jim Hannah both filed concur-
ring opinions, Justice Tom Glaze filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
(on the issue of staying the court's order until January 1, 2004), and Justice Annabelle Clin-
ton Imber did not take part in the decision. See generally id.
260. See generally id., 91 S.W.3d at 472.
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A. Determining the Court's Role
The court next turned to the State's assertion that the issue of school
finance was non-justiciable. 261 The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the
State's contention that the trial court's ruling on school-funding interfered
with a duty expressly granted to the General Assembly. 262 Reiterating its
finding in DuPree263 that the legislature has the responsibility of determin-
ing how to provide a constitutional school-funding system, the court noted
its own duty to determine when the system is unconstitutional.2 4 Those
duties, the court found, are distinct, and the court's performance of its duty
does not interfere with the General Assembly's power.265
The court also found it significant that the Arkansas Education Clause
makes "the State" responsible for providing an adequate education.266 Dis-
tinguishing Arkansas's Education Clause language from the language of
those jurisdictions that the State had cited, the court noted that the cited
states make "the General Assembly" responsible for education.267 The court
further noted that the education clauses in the four previous Arkansas Con-
stitutions used "General Assembly" rather than "State," surmising that, in
1874, Arkansans deliberately shifted the burden to all state entities to
share.268 The court adopted the Kentucky Supreme Court's stance that it
would be an abrogation of its duty not to rule on the school-funding system,
particularly given the wide-spread effect of school funding on both the
state's economy and its citizens.269
Next, the court addressed the State's assertion that the court cannot ad-
judicate adequacy because the court cannot define adequacy. 270 The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court, pointing to attempts by both the courts and the legisla-
ture to form a definition, recognized the inherent difficulty of deciding what
is not adequate without knowing what is adequate. 27' Noting that the Gen-
eral Assembly had taken steps to provide a definition, the court found that
just because the Arkansas Department of Education had been recalcitrant in
261. Id. at 51-52, 91 S.W.3d at 483-84.
262. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 483-84.
263. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
264. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 82, 91 S.W.3d at 483.
265. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 483.
266. Id. at 52-53, 91 S.W.3d at 484.
267. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 484.
268. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 484.
269. Id. at 53-54, 91 S.W.3d at 484 (noting that school finance makes up almost fifty
percent of the state budget and affects most of the state's school-age children).
270. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 56, 91 S.W.3d at 486.
271. See id. at 57-58, 91 S.W.3d at 486-87 (indicating that both then Judge Imber and
Judge Kilgore stated the need for an adequacy study and the General Assembly directed the
State Board of Education to conduct such a study in Act 917 of 1995).
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performing a legislatively mandated adequacy study does not mean that
adequacy is indeterminable.272 In noting that the lower courts had used the
Kentucky Supreme Court's 2 73 standards to determine educational efficiency,
the Arkansas Supreme Court found that it could determine the adequacy of
the state's educational funding system.274 The court held, therefore, that the
issue was justiciable.275
The Arkansas Supreme Court then evaluated the nexus between in-
creased funds and increased performance.276 Focusing on low teacher sala-
ries, the court listed the rankings and performance results from the 2001
Order.277 In looking at the evidence submitted by Dr. Raymond Simon, di-
rector of the Arkansas Department of Education, the court determined that
student performance would increase if the state addressed its serious need
for more teachers.278 The court reasoned that hiring more teachers requires
more money, and if more teachers lead to better performance, then the in-
creased money would positively lead to improved performance.2 79 The court
also found a link between school-environment issues and student perform-
ance, finding that increased funding would resolve such issues as deficient
buildings and equipment, insufficient supplies, and the completion of much
needed construction projects. 280 Dismissing the no-nexus assertion, the court
determined that education deserves priority in the state's funding process
and that "no program of state government takes precedence over it."
281
With that determination in mind, the court addressed the level of judi-
cial review of school funding legislation.282 If the court found that education
was a fundamental right in Arkansas, the court would have to apply strict
scrutiny in analyzing school-funding legislation. 283 Pointing to the personal
rights listed in the Arkansas Constitution, 284 the court noted that the drafters
addressed education in a separate article altogether, and that article
272. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 486-87.
273. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 486-87 (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1989)).
274. Id. at 58-59, 91 S.W.3d at 487-88.
275. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 487-88.
276. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 59-61,91 S.W.3d at 488-89.
277. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 488-89.
278. Id. at 62-63, 91 S.W.3d at 489-90.
279. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 489-90.
280. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 489-90. The court also noted that in 2001 all schools in the state's
academic distress program were poor and that poor districts cannot participate in Debt Ser-
vice Fund supplements because they are too poor to incur the debt in the first place. Id. at
63-64, 91 S.W.3d at 490.
281. Id. at 66,91 S.W.3d at 492.
282. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 66-68, 91 S.W.3d at 492-93.
283. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 492-93.
284. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 2.
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addresses the state's duties rather than a citizen's rights.285 The Arkansas
Supreme Court then determined that in neither the 1994 Order nor the 2001
Order had the trial court expressly stated that education was a fundamental
right. 286 Next, the Arkansas Supreme Court discussed the route other courts
had taken and noted that most had not made a determination as to whether
education is a fundamental right.287
The Arkansas Supreme Court thus avoided the fundamental rights de-
termination.288 The court determined that the debate on fundamental rights
was unnecessary because the school funding system is either adequate or
inadequate. 289 The court decided that the Arkansas system is not ade-
quate.290 The court, however, left it to the majoritarian branches to define
adequacy, finding that this "falls more within the bailiwick of the General
Assembly and the Department of Education.
29'
B. Determining Constitutionality
The court conceded that the concepts of inequity and inadequacy sig-
nificantly overlap. 292 As long as the state's school funding system fails to
provide an adequate education, the court noted, the system could not, by
definition, provide' equal educational opportunity. 293 The court considered
several factors in making its determination of inadequacy. 294 The court
looked at student achievement levels as measured by both national and state
tests, examined the substandard facilities and insufficient equipment and
supplies plaguing several school districts, and considered the state's rela-
tively low teacher salaries.
295
285. See ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 14, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 53.
286. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 70, 91 S.W.3d at 494.
287. Id. at 67-69, 91 S.W.3d at 493-94.
288. Id. at 71, 91 S.W.3d at 495.
289. See id., 91 S.W.3d at 495 (finding that the state has an absolute duty to provide an
adequate education).
290. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 495.
291. Id. at 71, 91 S.W.3d at 507. Although the court expressed frustration with the state's
under-funding of the school system and its failure to conduct an adequacy study, the court
was reluctant to oversee the school financing system. Id. at 70-71, 91 S.W.3d at 495.
292. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 71, 91 S.W.3d at 496. The court embedded the element of
adequacy in its definition of equity, finding that "[e]quality of educational opportunity must
include as basic components substantially equal curricula, substantially equal facilities, and
substantially equal equipmentfor obtaining an adequate education." Id. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at
500 (emphasis added).
293. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 500.
294. See id. at 62-63, 91 S.W.3d at 490.
295. Id. at 60-61, 91 S.W.3d at 488-90.
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In finding Arkansas's school funding system inequitable, the court
considered several of the same issues. 296 The primary difference between
the court's adequacy analysis and its equity analysis is that the court's ade-
quacy analysis compared student achievement to quality standards; whereas,
the equity analysis compared student educational opportunities among the
state's districts.297 The State contended that it had ensured educational eq-
uity through equal funding, but the court rejected this contention based on
its finding that the appropriate measure for educational equity is equal ex-
penditures.298
To determine the inequity in expenditures, the court compared the cur-
ricula in the Lake View and the Fort Smith school districts. 299 The court
then looked at the same facility and equipment deficiencies identified in its
adequacy analysis. 300 Finally, the court considered the intra-state differences
in teacher salaries.30' The court found that the discrepancies in these factors
represented inequity in educational opportunity.3 °2
The State argued that two factors-the State's responsibility to fund
other programs along with the local control of school districts-provided
303legitimate reasons for the school funding disparities. The court summarily
dismissed the funding rationale as unconvincing.3°4 The court then ad-
296. Id. at 75-76, 91 S.W.3d at 497-98.
297. Id. at 73, 91 S.W.3d at 497.
298. Lake View IV, 351 Ark, at 71, 91 S.W.3d at 496.
299. See id. at 75, 91 S.W.3d at 497 (finding that Lake View had very limited offerings
while Fort Smith offered both advanced classes and diverse electives such as fashion mer-
chandising and marketing).
300. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 497-98.
301. Id. at 62, 91 S.W.3d at 489; see discussion supra Part II.C.
302. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at 500. The court also ruled on the Federal
Range Ratio calculation, which the lower court used in determining inequity. Id at 84-85, 91
S.W.3d at 503-04; see discussion infra Part III.A.l.b.ii. The court found that federal deseg-
regation funds were properly excluded in the calculation of the state's total available educa-
tion funds. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 84-85, 91 S.W.3d at 503-04. The court also deter-
mined that excess debt millage should not have been applied towards Amendment 74's
minimum twenty-five mills requirement for the operation and maintenance of schools. Id., 91
S.W.3d at 503-04; ARK. CONST. of 1874 amend. 74; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-80-204(18)
(LEXIS Supp. 2001); Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 89-91, 91 S.W.3d at 506. The court deter-
mined that counting excess debt millage towards the minimum millage is contrary to the
intent of Amendment 74 because the additional category allows districts to pass less than the
required minimum millage earmarked for operations and maintenance. Lake View IV, 351
Ark. at 87, 91 S.W.3d at 505. After the ruling, Senate President Pro Tempore Mike Beebe
(elected as Arkansas's Attorney General in November, 2002), who was involved in writing
Amendment 74, stated that the court misinterpreted the amendment and that the General
Assembly intended to allow the districts to use excess debt millage towards the twenty-five
mills minimum for operations and maintenance. See Rowett, supra note 43, at 1.
303. Lake ViewlV, 351 Ark. at 78, 91 S.W.3d at 499.
304. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 499-500.
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dressed the State's concern for local control in the area of education.305 The
court again pointed to its decision in DuPree, °6 in which the court had de-
termined that, although the State can create school districts to carry out its
educational duties, the State must intervene if the districts do not produce
the desired results.3 °7 Because the State bears the ultimate responsibility for
Arkansas's public school system, the court found that the State's deference
to local school districts was not a legitimate reason for providing an inequi-
table funding system.3 °8
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded by granting a stay on the ef-
fects of its decision.30 9 The court expressed concerns about a potential up-
roar of legal contests resulting from a ruling that deemed the funding system
immediately unconstitutional.31 ° Instead, the court gave the legislature until
January 1, 2004, to develop an adequate and equitable school funding sys-
tem.3
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Lake View IV 312 will earn landmark status in Arkansas's judicial his-
tory because the court's decision could potentially affect every current and
future Arkansan.1 3 The case is significant not only because of what the
court held, but also because of what the court held back. In finding the Ar-
kansas school funding system unconstitutional, the court exercised judicial
activism to open the door for reform; the court left it to the political
branches, however, to determine what would make the school funding sys-
tem constitutional. 314 The court's combination approach of stepping out to
declare inadequacy, yet stepping back without defining it, has led to a man-
date for reform mired in unanswered questions. This. section first explains
how activism led to the court's determination of inadequacy, and the section
then examines the questions that the court left unanswered.
305. Id. at 78-79, 91 S.W.3d at 499-500.
306. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
307. Id. at 349, 651 S.W.2d at 95.
308. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 78-79, 91 S.W.3d at 499-500.
309. Id. at 96-97,91 S.W.3d at 510-11.
310. Id.,91 S.W.3dat510-11.
311. Id. at 97, 91 S.W.3dat511.
312. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002).
313. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with David R. Matthews, Partner, Matthews, Camp-
bell, Rhoads, McClure, Thompson & Fryauf, P.A. (Jan. 2, 2003) (stating that this is probably
the most significant case in Arkansas in the last fifty years); Telephone Interview with Mike
Beebe, President Pro Tempore, Arkansas Senate (Dec. 30, 2002) (stating that this case will
have far-reaching effects in terms of both Arkansas's finances and its educational system).
314. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 91,91 S.W.3d at 507.
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The court recognized that local school districts were not making the
grade and that the legislature was not addressing the issue of sufficient
funding for Arkansas schools. 315 The State did not contest the evidence sup-
porting the abysmal status of Arkansas's schools.3 16 Ten classes of students
had graduated from Arkansas's school system since this case began, but the
Arkansas Department of Education had still not conducted the court-
mandated adequacy study.3' 7 Courts are in a unique position to provide edu-
cational reform for those parties who would not necessarily have support
from the political process, namely the students in poor districts. 31 8 The
court's engagement under these circumstances was a classic example of
judicial activism.
319
Although the courts have neither the expertise nor the extensive fact-
finding forum for making specific educational reforms, they can provide the
impetus for the majoritarian branches to bring reform.32 ° Courts can play the
role of "shak[ing] things up."' 32' The Arkansas Supreme Court could have
adopted the position taken by the Florida322 and Alabama323 supreme courts
in finding that the school funding system is a non-justiciable political ques-
tion. In finding both judicial power and responsibility to address this issue,
however, the court chose to step into the fray.324 Among its reasons for tak-
ing this step was the court's indication that the constitution provides a
shared textual commitment in the area of school funding because the educa-
tion clause grants responsibility to the "State" rather than to the "General
Assembly. 325
The court found additional significance in the term "State" in its em-
phatic determination that local control is not a legitimate reason for provid-
ing insufficient funding, because education in Arkansas is a state responsi-
bility.3 26 With the political realities of school consolidation and increased
state oversight looming as inevitable results of this decision, the court un-
doubtedly knew that this ruling would elicit outcries about a loss of local
315. Id. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at 500.
316. Id. at 59-61, 91 S.W.3d at 488-89.
317. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5318, 53 (Ark. Ch. 2001)
(noting that as of May 2001 nine classes had graduated).
318. See Clune, supra note 10, at 4.
319. See Swenson, supra note 224, at 1149-50 (stating that "[s]triking down a statewide
system of public school finance is a quintessential example of judicial activism").
320. See Clune, supra note 10, at 4.
321. See id.
322. Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400
(Fla. 1996).
323. Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002).
324. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. 31, 55, 91 S.W.3d 472, 485 (2002).
325. Id. at 54-55, 91 S.W.3d at 484-85.
326. Id. at 78-79, 91 S.W.3d 499-500.
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control. 327 The court was likely also aware that this outcry would induce the
same political pressure brought by previous consolidation plans. The court
was right on both counts.
328
Because the court explicitly laid the burden at the steps of the Arkansas
State Capitol, 329 the political branches will be able to point to the court as
the culprit that shifted control away from local school districts. Almost im-
mediately after the ruling, Governor Mike Huckabee used the opportunity to
propose a consolidation plan and claimed that the court forced him to do
it. 330 In addressing local control, the court's action gave the majoritarian
branches an opportunity to face issues like increased taxation and consolida-
tion with a political scapegoat, disallowing one of the major reasons for not
addressing these difficult questions.33'
The court moved a step beyond its decision in DuPree332 when it inter-
preted the need for a new requirement of adequacy. In Lake View IV the
court held that simply equalizing the funding formula was no longer suffi-
cient.333 Arkansas's public education had not improved significantly since
DuPree, so a subsequent attempt to provide an equitable funding system
would not likely improve educational opportunity.334 The court's introduc-
tion of the adequacy determination could reduce political apprehension if
that determination were to lead to more concrete results than the equity-
based legislation produced.335
The requirement of an adequate education is nowhere to be found in
the Arkansas Constitution.336 The court, using a map provided by the Ken-
327. See, e.g., Seth Blomeley, Consolidation Push Brings Touch of Deja Vu, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Jan. 19, 2003, at 1. Commentators have touted local control of school
districts as a cultural issue, and many Arkansans believe that consolidation takes away from
who we are and where we come from. Interview with Herschel Cleveland, Speaker, Arkansas
House of Representatives, in Little Rock, Ark. (Jan. 22, 2003).
328. See Blomeley, supra note 327, at 1.
329. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 78-79, 91 S.W.3d at 490-500 (finding that the Gen-
eral Assembly, not the local school districts, has the ultimate responsibility for Arkansas's
educational system).
330. See Michael Wickline, Ears Out on Education Changes: Legislators Use Weekend
To Take State's Pulse on Consolidation, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 2003, at 10
(reporting that Governor Huckabee proposed a consolidation plan reducing the number of
districts from 310 to 116 and that he remarked that the court's "ruling abolished local con-
trol").
331. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 78-79, 91 S.W.3d at 499-500.
332. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
333. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 78-79, 91 S.W.3d at 499-500.
334. Id. at 59, 91 S.W.3d at 488.
335. See discussion supra Part IL.A (describing the 1995 Legislative Acts and the 1997
Legislative Acts as attempts to equalize school funding).
336. See ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 14, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 53 (stating
Arkansas's educational responsibilities without using the word "adequate").
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tucky Supreme Court,337 took an indirect route to finding the adequacy re-
quirement. The court started with the three words that are listed in the con-
stitution, "general, suitable, and efficient" and translated them to mean
"adequate. '" 339 Other than a reference to the Rose standards, the court did
not explain how it made that transformation. 340 The Rose standards defined
an "efficient" education, but the Kentucky Supreme Court used those stan-
dards to define an adequate education.
34'
The court exercised restraint in defining adequacy. It listed the Rose
standards as a measurement by which it determined existing inadequacy, yet
it did not rule that these were the standards the state should adopt.342 In-
stead, it left it up to the General Assembly to define an adequate educa-
tion.34 3
The court's ruling leaves the legislature to define the standards by
which the court will measure adequacy in future litigation. The court, how-
ever, clearly stated that it would find future funding systems inadequate
should the legislature fail to provide the court's interpretation of constitu-
tionally guaranteed standards. 344 This combination of pronouncements
seems to indicate that the court determined that the General Assembly
should define adequacy, yet the court could determine the sufficiency of
that definition in future litigation. 345 The legislature, therefore, would need
to know what the court had in mind in its interpretation of adequacy. The
court did not provide a basis for the legislature to make this determination
because the court did not articulate an adequacy standard that it would use
in future litigation.
Although it did not provide a definition, the court did give some gen-
eral guidance in defining adequacy.34 6 The court said that it could not meas-
337. See generally Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
338. Seegenerally id.
339. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 55-56, 91 S.W.3d at 486-87.
340. Id. at 58-59, 91 S.W.3d at 487-88.
341. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. Even the attorneys were unclear about adequacy being a
measuring term until the compliance trial, as evidenced by Lake View's attempt to file a
separate suit based on adequacy and the State's argument that the compliance trial was sup-
posed to rule on equity only. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 56, 91 S.W.3d at 486 (Hannah, J.,
concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Hannah discussed the definition of the words "gen-
eral, suitable and efficient" independently. Id. at 102-04, 91 S.W.3d at 514-17. He con-
cluded that equitable and adequate are not the appropriate measures and stated that the ques-
tion is whether the school system is general, suitable, and efficient in the plain meaning of
those terms. Id., 91 S.W.3d at 514-17 (Hannah, J., concurring).
342. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 58-59, 91 S.W.3d at 487-88.
343. Id. at 91, 91 S.W.3d at 507.
344. Id. at98,91 S.W.3dat511.
345. See id.
346. Id at 57-58, 91 S.W.3d at 486-88.
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ure adequacy by inputs, i.e., funding.347 The other possible measurements
are expenditures and outputs. 348 The court's guidance is less clear regarding
these two measurements. 349 This lack of clarity derives from the question of
whether the court refers to "adequacy" as "access to adequate funding" or as
"an opportunity for an adequate education." 350
Measuring the "access to adequate funding" for education begs the
question, because the court must still define "adequate." The court ruled that
the school system is inadequately funded, but the court based this finding on
a combination of anecdotal evidence and examples of shortfalls in the cur-
rent educational system. 351 This method of determination indicates that the
court was seeking something in addition to adequate funding in its guidance
concerning adequacy.
The court's measurement of the quality of education is an indication
that the court sought particular educational outcomes to determine ade-
quacy.352 If the court expects particular outcomes from an adequate educa-
tional system, then perhaps the court actually found that the State has the
burden of providing each child an opportunity for an adequate education.353
This requirement is quite different from providing adequate funding because
funding is only one aspect of how the legislature might go about providing
for an adequate educational opportunity.354 Ruling that the school system
funding was inadequate, yet using outcome measures in that determination,
created the need for a nexus between increased funding and improved out-
comes. Few studies, however, suggest such a nexus exists.355
In addition to the nexus issue, using outcome measures brings other
questions for the legislature's consideration. The legislature must decide
which outcomes are determinative of an adequate education.356 If adequacy
is based on outcomes, then the General Assembly would need to decide how
long after implementing a new educational system either the court or the
legislature could determinatively measure those outcomes.
347. Id. at 73-75, 91 S.W.3d at 496-97.
348. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 23.
349. See Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 73-79, 91 S.W.3d at 497-500.
350. See id., 91 S.W.3d at 497-500.
351. Id. at 62-64, 91 S.W.3d at 489-90.
352. See id., 91 S.W.3d at 489-90; Kelley Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School
Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV.
399, 438 (2000).
353. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at 500.
354. See William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Re-
form, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 83, at 72, 83.
355. See, e.g., Frederick M. Hess, Courting Backlash: The Risks of Emphasizing Input
Equity Over School Performance, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 11, 17 (1998).
356. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 58.
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The court's decision also lacks clarity as to whether local districts
could spend more to increase opportunity beyond producing adequate out-
comes. 357 By definition this would require inequitable expenditures, but the
court's only response to this was that there could not be substantially ineq-
uitable spending among the districts.358 Districts would very likely require,
however, substantially inequitable spending levels to achieve the same out-
comes because the per-pupil cost will be greater in some districts (e.g.,
those with low parental involvement) to get the same outcomes as other
districts. 359 If the goal is the outcome, then the per-pupil expenditure be-
360comes a legitimate variable and inequity becomes almost necessary.
Making the adequacy measurement based on outcomes has advantages.
After the legislature defines specific outcomes, those outcomes would pro-
vide concrete, measurable standards for litigants, the court, and the legisla-
ture. 361 Additionally, holding the state accountable for outcomes instead of
adjudicating spending levels might prove more politically acceptable. 362 If
the court bases constitutionality of the educational funding systems on out-
comes, then citizens would see what they are getting in exchange for the
cost, which comes in the form of both money and loss of local control.363
Outcome measures might backfire because, if the outcomes do not ma-
terialize, failure could thwart future reform attempts.36 If more money does
not improve outcomes, that failure would solidify the argument that in-
creased funds do not improve the quality of education. Such results might
leave citizens feeling that their loss of local control resulted in no return.
Notwithstanding the political pressures of local control activists and
challenges of justiciability, the court opened the door so that the necessary
reform could begin. In refraining from defining where adequacy came from,
what adequacy is, and how one should measure adequacy, the court created
as many questions as it answered. The court granted a stay on the effects of
its order until January 1, 2004, and stated that on that date "this case will be
over." 365 With the open door of reform and the open questions of adequacy,
357. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 77, 91 S.W.3d at 499. But see id. at 107, 91 S.W.3d at
517-18 (Hannah, J., concurring) (stating that after all districts receive adequate funding local
districts are not prohibited from spending beyond that amount).
358. Id. at 77, 91 S.W.3d at 499.
359. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 101, at 23-24.
360. See id.
361. See Hess, supra note 355, at 46.
362. Id. at 16.
363. Jd. at 46.
364. Id.
365. Lake View IV, 351 Ark. at 97, 91 S.W.3d at 511.
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however, the end of this case will have marked only the beginning of Ar-
kansas's quest for a constitutional school funding system.
Brian E. Carter*
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